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Iin Hungary, VAt rates changed significantly in 2016 and in 2017, which allows for the study of a highly researched area, which is also of high interest to the public: the price impacts of VAt changes. Policy-makers often 
argue that VAt changes stimulate the econo-
my or certain sectors, or serve social purpos-
es, but this is probably not always the case, 
as our study shows. There is another reason 
why analysing price impacts is important: in 
addition to international empirical literature, 
it serves as a basis for predicting the effects of 
future VAt changes. The passthrough of VAt 
changes is an empirical fact that can provide 
motivation and help in theoretical research as 
well. if passthrough is assessed and the fea-
tures of demand, supply and market struc-
tures that influence passthrough are explored, 
it can contribute to planning VAt changes 
that are optimal from a social policy view-
point as well. to our knowledge, the price im-
pacts of the VAt changes in Hungary in 2016 
and 2017 have not yet been analysed, so our 
study aims to answer this question, relying on 
the new methodology of the 2000s, the syn-
thetic control method. The extent of some of 
the VAt changes analysed is really great, 22 
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percentage points (from 27% to 5%). First 
we review the theoretical determinants of 
passthrough, then we explore the potential 
policy objectives of VAt changes. We then go 
on to compare our empirical results with the 
findings of international literature and with 
the passthrough of previous VAt changes in 
Hungary. This way we can draw a conclusion 
as to the effects of the 2016–2017 VAt cuts 
on the real economy, especially on catering.
THEoRETicAl dETERminAnTS  
of pASSTHRougH
One of the most direct of the economic ef-
fects of VAt changes is passthrough, several 
other effects are exerted through that. Full 
passthrough is when the VAt change fully 
shifts to consumer prices. Often just a part 
of the price impact can be detected at the 
time of the VAt rate change, and other parts 
appear later, gradually, or even before the 
change. According to Hungarian an inter-
national literature, the scale and time course 
of price impacts are affected by the direction 
of the tax change (increase or decrease), even 
though for a long time experts assumed that 
tax shifts were symmetric (Politi, Mattos, 
2011).2 The intensity of market competition 
and the structure of the market in the sec-
tors concerned cannot be ignored, either: in 
addition to the elasticity of supply and de-
mand of the products, market power, strate-
gic cooperations and the level of competition 
all influence how VAt change shifts to con-
sumer prices. The extent of the VAt change 
may also be important, as a significant change 
may, through psychological factors, trigger 
disproportionately strong reactions in market 
operators, while a less substantial VAt change 
may not shift to prices at all. Behavioural as-
pects include the date when the changes are 
announced and the timeframe of their imple-
mentation, as these influence prices through 
expectations. Based on theories explaining 
passthrough, Table 1 shows the most impor-
tant factors affecting this phenomenon.
Economic EffEcTS And policy 
objEcTiVES of VAT cHAngES
A general change in VAt rates, and the exten-
sion or restriction of the scope of reduced rates 
definitely affect the income and consumption 
of economic operators. A basic question is 
whether the change – e.g. a reduced rate is 
applied to a product category – shifts to con-
sumers prices or not. if yes, it is primarily the 
behaviour and consumption pattern of the 
product’s consumers that may change. if not, 
the profitability of selling the product will 
change, which, ultimately, may be reflected in 
the profit of the owners and/or income of the 
employees. As a result, passthrough is not a 
necessary condition for economic effects.
if VAt changes shift to prices, demand-
side reactions are to be expected (Copenha-
gen economics, 2007). Changes in demand 
may vary by income level and product type as 
well. in addition to the change in price, de-
mand for a given product is also influenced by 
how the price of other products have changed, 
how total purchasing power has been affected 
by the VAt rate change, and how flexibly 
the demand for the given product reacts to 
changes in income. As we can see from the 
findings in international literature, the own-
price elasticity of food items is negative, but 
has a low absolute value, which means that 
in case of a price increase, consumption de-
creases, but to a lesser extent (Menezes et 
al., 2011). This international observation is 
substantiated by three analyses with regard 
to Hungary. in Hungary, estimations were 
made in 2013 with the eCONS-tAX model, 
while Cseres and Gergely (2008 and 2016) an-
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Table 1
DETERMINANTS OF PASSTHROUGH
Determinant Description
demand elasticities demand elasticities are important determinants of passthrough. When demand elasticity is 
high, passthrough is lower, while in case of inelastic demand, the whole tax can be passed on 
to the consumers. price elasticity also depends on income.
consumer expectations The demand curve represents the expectations of consumers. According to behavioural 
economics, it varies by market which costs consumers accept readily to be built in prices, but 
in general they expect to be treated fairly, and they accept increased costs (raw material prices, 
tax changes) as reasons for price increases, but not a wish to increase profits. Tax changes 
are readily accepted, and as such they provide an opportunity to introduce price increases that 
have been postponed.
Supply elasticities High supply elasticities will create larger effects on prices and production. in the short 
run, supply curves may have upward boundaries so that positive demand effects cannot be 
satisfied. Thus, a VAT reduction could lead to no short-run effects, even if it led to a price 
decrease. 
market structure Stronger competition leads to more significant passthrough. A VAT increase may provide an 
opportunity for companies to attempt to push competitors out of the market, and to this end, 
they may not increase prices immediately. pricing also depends on the level of cooperation 
on the market. market power also determines fundamentally if a company can keep its prices 
above marginal cost in the long term.
level of integration in the 
supply chain
if the supply chain is fragmented, certain market operators with less significant market power in 
the chain may cause significant distortion, their effects may add up. double marginalization is 
a phenomenon that happens when there is no perfect competition between the members of the 
chain (berezvai, 2018).
market size Exposure to international markets may also affect passthrough mechanisms, like the accession 
to the Eu in central Europe in 2004.
cost structure of companies, 
the shape of the cost curve
According to scientific literature, cost structure also affects supply-side behaviour. The cost 
curve may be non-linear, and in this case, according to berezvai (2018), more complex 
examinations are necessary.
menu costs menu costs introduce a limit in pricing decisions, as changing prices and displaying new 
prices also cost money. As a result, if the VAT increase is smaller than menu costs, there will 
be no passthrough – this is an example of price stickiness. According to jonker et al. (2004) 
prices are the stickiest in small firms.
Administrative costs if legal regulations are complicated, it is not only a problem for customers, but it also results 
in a tendency on the supply-side to leave prices unchanged. Especially if the VAT reduction is 
only temporary.
Weight of the product 
category
if the weight of the product in the consumer basket is low, the consumer commits less 
resources to finding the cheapest product, which results in less intense competition and lower 
passthrough. The demand elasticity of narrower product categories is higher, this may also 
decrease passthrough.
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alysed price elasticities on cross-sectional and 
panel data with the QAidS model. All three 
studies found that the own-price elasticity of 
food items is negative, but has a low absolute 
value. This means that consumption decreas-
es only slightly as a result of price increases 
(Cserháti and Keresztély, 2017). Households 
try to maintain the level of food consump-
tion regardless of price changes, which also 
means that the increase in the price of food 
decreases the consumption of other product 
groups. This is caused by the income effect: 
if consumers wish to maintain their previous 
level of food consumption when prices have 
gone up, they will simply have less money for 
buying products from other groups (Green et 
al., 2013). The own-price elasticity of food-
stuff decreases as the proportion of food in 
total expenditure increases, since narrower 
categories always have better substitutes. in-
come elasticity increases as the consumption 
category increases, since the amount spent 
on consumption categories that are less sig-
nificant compared to the income is not deter-
mined by income, but by other factors.
The distributional effects of VAt rate 
changes can be detected more clearly (Co-
penhagen economics, 2007). even if changes 
are properly targeted (the VAt rate is reduced 
for a product that poor households consume 
in larger proportions), the amount wealthier 
households save this way will probably be 
higher, due to their higher consumption ex-
penditure (torres, 2015). This means that this 
type of redistribution is rather expensive, even 
if poor households can save more as a propor-
tion of income or expenditure. VAt rate reduc-
tions targeting poor households explicitly (e.g. 
basic foodstuff, water supply) surely achieve 
the direct goal, but their effectiveness is very 
low, due to the factors mentioned above (Co-
penhagen economics, 2007). even though, 
through price impacts, VAt changes may af-
fect the consumption structure and through 
that specific social goals, such VAt decreases 
are usually very regressive. The reason for this 
is that the consumption of such products and 
services (healthy food, culture-related prod-
ucts and services, environmentally friendly, 
energy-saving products, etc.) highly depends 
on the income of the individual. As a result, 
households with higher income, which are 
less price-sensitive and whose consumption is 
less affected by price change, typically benefit 
more from “consumption steering” subsidies 
provided in the form of VAt reductions. This 
Determinant Description
distinguishing product 
categories
if it is easy for consumers to distinguish products that are affected by the VAT change, it may 
lead to a larger price impact. if it is not clear which products are included in the VAT reduction, 
the price impact is lower.
psychological factors demand-side reactions to price changes are also determined by psychological factors. for 
example, demand may disproportionately react to significant price changes.
Relationship of trust close seller-customer relationships with local suppliers also increase passthrough and 
limit the monopolistic situation of the supply side to maintain trust in the long term. This 
monopolistic situation is caused by the fact that local suppliers often have great market power 
due to travel and transport costs. According to crosby et al (1990), it is in the interest of both 
the seller and the customer to have agreements based on mutual trust.
Source: copenhagen Economics (2007), melioris and Sramkova (2015), dijkstra et al. (2013), jonker et al. (2004)  
and berezvai (2018)
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means that such measures constitute very in-
effective means for supporting social goals 
(Chouinard, 2015).
As a result, several studies have found that 
from a welfare aspect, a system with a uni-
form rate for every product and service with 
no reduced rates is better, and redistribution 
goals can be achieved more effectively with 
targeted, direct benefits. even though the 
proportion of consumption taxes decrease 
as income increases, i.e. VAt is usually re-
gressive against income, the main reason for 
this is the higher savings rate of households 
with higher income, and not a difference in 
the composition of consumption. This means 
that reduced rates can compensate this only 
to a limited extent, and as they become more 
prevalent, rent-seeking and economic distor-
tions are more likely to happen. According to 
Cserháti and Keresztély (2017), these findings 
also apply to Hungary. in 2010 and 2017, the 
tax burden was the highest in the third in-
come decile, while the VAt burden was the 
lowest in the ninth decile. interestingly, when 
the different types of municipalities are exam-
ined, there is negative correlation between the 
level of the VAt burden and the size of the 
municipality. Their research also highlights 
that between 2010 and 2017, the VAt bur-
den was, basically, continuously decreasing. 
The only exception was the wealthiest 10% of 
households, where, between 2010 and 2017, 
there was a slight (0.07 percentage point) 
increase in this burden. The VAt burden is 
expected to decrease further in every income 
decile in 2018. 
VAt changes may have general economic 
effects as well. targeted VAt rate decreases 
may, in theory, under certain circumstances 
improve productivity and increase labour 
demand (mostly for low-skilled labour). The 
extent of the changes highly depends on the 
labour intensity of the sector, the elasticity of 
the labour market, and the balance between 
supply and demand on the labour market. 
However, it is exactly this heterogeneity that 
makes it difficult to draw general conclu-
sions. There are few estimates about this is-
sue, which suggest that the effect on output in 
labour-intensive sectors is rather temporary, 
and thus the employment impact is minimal 
(Copenhagen economics, 2007). 
Policy-makers often introduce VAt chang-
es to achieve a certain combination of the 
objectives mentioned, this is why we need to 
know the economic effects of real VAt chang-
es. in the following section, we examine how 
passthrough can be described as the prima-
ry trigger mechanism of economic changes, 
based on empirical data.
pASSTHRougH in ViEW of EmpiRicAl 
dATA
International experience
VAt changes often have partial effects. Ac-
cording to Alm et al. (2009), in urban areas 
in the uS, tax changes fully shift to gasoline 
prices, but in rural areas shifting is less than 
full. Politi and Mattos (2011) rejected the 
hypothesis of full shifting for 10 Brazilian 
food items, while Benedek et al. (2015) exam-
ined 1231 VAt changes in the eurozone and 
found that around one-third of VAt changes 
is passed forward to consumer prices. Analys-
ing two VAt rate reductions in France, Car-
bonnier (2007) found that VAt rate shifting 
was 77% and 57% in the first four months 
for housing repair services and car sales. Bar-
bone, Sobolewski and Musters (2015) say that 
in more competitive markets (air transport 
and railway) there is almost full passthrough, 
while it is only partial in road and waterborne 
transport. Kosonen (2013) studied VAt reduc-
tion at hairdressers in Finland, and found that 
passthrough was about 50%. Results are simi-
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lar for other services, such as VAt cuts in the 
restaurant sector (Benzarti and Carloni, 2017; 
Harju and Kosonen, 2014). The question 
arises: what are the factors behind the partial 
passthrough that is observed in the majority 
of cases?
Asymmetric passthrough is a major factor. 
Several studies have found a certain asym-
metry, which means that in case of similar 
changes in VAt, increases are passed through 
to prices to a higher extent than cuts, i.e. 
the extent of passthrough also depends on 
the direction of the VAt change (for poten-
tial reasons, see Table 2). Gábriel and Reiff 
(2010) found that the passthrough of the 
2006 VAt cut was considerably lower than 
the passthrough of the VAt increase of the 
same year and of the 2004 VAt increase. Ben-
zarti et al. (2017) studied the effects of VAt 
rate changes in eu member states between 
1996 and 2015, and found that VAt rate in-
creases usually shifted to prices to a greater 
extent than VAt cuts did. Melioris and Sram-
kova (2015), and Benzarti and Carloni (2017) 
analysed a smaller group of VAt changes 
in their studies and also found asymmetric 
passthrough. The findings of the former study 
suggest that in Slovakia passthrough was 
strong in the events of tax increases, while the 
impact on prices was insignificant in cases of 
VAt rate reductions (however, the authors 
add that the latter result might have been af-
fected by the specific nature of VAt changes). 
Asymmetry is thus substantiated by a number 
Table 2
POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ASYMMETRIC  
PASSTHROUGH
Factor Description
menu costs if inflation is large enough relative to menu costs, firms would adjust prices upwards but not 
necessarily downwards in order to avoid paying any menu costs.
loss averse firm owners due to the loss aversion of firm owners in a model of monopolistic competition, VAT increases 
are more likely to bring profit margins in the loss-domain (even if it is just the subjective 
perception of the owners) and are therefore more likely to trigger price changes than VAT 
reductions.
fairness and consumer 
loyalty
customers may accept price increases if they prevent firm profits from decreasing, but do not 
feel antagonism towards firms’ failure to adjust prices downwards. firms might respond to 
fairness considerations when setting prices because of the risk of losing some of their loyal 
customers.
convex demand and/or 
supply curves
depending on the curvature of the functions, large VAT changes can lead to large differences in 
passthrough.
capacity constraints capacity constraints can lead to price rigidity. if firms cannot cater to additional demand, they 
may be less likely to change prices.
collusion if firms are able to collude, they can fully pass through VAT increases and only partially pass 
through VAT decreases.
Note: According to benzarti and carloni (2017) the first three mechanisms are plausible, and they tried to refute the other three. 
Source: benzarti and carloni (2017)
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of studies (Politi and Mattos, 2011; Jonker et 
al., 2004; Carbonnier, 2005, Benkovskis and 
Fadejeva, 2013).
There are several explanations for asym-
metric passthrough. While Benzarti et al. 
(2017) say the causes have not yet been fully 
understood by science, Benzarti and Carloni 
(2017) present three plausible causes. First, 
because of menu costs, firms adjust prices 
upwards but not downwards, which is sub-
stantiated by Karádi (2016). Second, due to 
the loss aversion of firm owners in a model 
of monopolistic competition, VAt increases 
are more likely to bring profit margins in the 
loss-domain (even if it is just the subjective 
perception of the owners) and are therefore 
more likely to trigger price changes than 
VAt reductions. Finally, firms are not ex-
clusively responding to demand and supply 
when setting prices, but they also examine 
how price changes are perceived and judged 
by customers. This is due to the fact that 
consumer behaviour may also be affected by 
fairness and loyalty towards the companies 
(table 2). 
effects of VAt changes may vary over time: 
after a VAt cut in the Swedish restaurant sec-
tor, for instance, passthrough increased over 
time (Falkenhall et al. 2015). VAt reforms 
are often announced well in advance, which 
affects the expectations of market operators. 
According to the empirically tested theoreti-
cal model of Buettner and Madzharova (2016), 
demand for durables gradually increase be-
tween the announcement and implementa-
tion and peaks right before the VAt increase. 
This is followed by a significant decline in 
demand after the VAt increase. Their results 
show that, with all other factors unchanged, 
a 1 percentage point VAt increase leads to a 
1–5% increase in sales before the implementa-
tion. Like economic effects, passthrough can 
also precede the implementation of the VAt 
change. Danninger and Carare (2008) stud-
ied the effects of the 3 percentage point VAt 
increase in 2007 in Germany, and found that 
cumulative passthrough was 73% over two 
years, and two thirds of that took place be-
fore the measure was implemented. Carbon-
nier (2005) helps us understand time aspects: 
he says that it is easier for companies to de-
crease output than to increase it, and this is 
why passthrough is partial and slow after a 
VAt cut, and it is immediate and higher af-
ter a VAt increase. This clearly demonstrates 
the link between partial and asymmetric 
passthrough. 
Passthrough in specific product groups is 
highly influenced by market characteristics, 
e.g. the intensity of market competition. This 
is determined by the elasticity of supply and 
demand and by the structure of the market. 
On the market of durable consumption items, 
for example, there is strong international 
competition and a global market, which is not 
the case with restaurant services. This may be 
the reason why Benzarti and Carloni (2017) 
found only partial passthrough after a signifi-
cant VAt rate cut in the restaurant sector in 
France. Karádi (2016) examined the effects 
of the 2006 VAt change on a small group 
of processed food items and found that there 
was full passthrough of both VAt increases 
and VAt cuts, but while the effect was imme-
diate after increases, it was slower after reduc-
tions (approx. 3 months). Politi and Mattos 
(2011) rejected the hypothesis of full shift-
ing, analysing ten Brazilian food items. These 
phenomena may be explained by the higher 
market power of service providers in case of 
certain services, as they may be in a monopo-
listic situation locally. According to Alm et. 
al (2009), for instance, the uS fuel market 
has more monopolistic features in rural areas 
than in urban areas. Barbone, Sobolewski and 
Musters (2015) pointed out the importance of 
competition in passenger transport.
Passthrough is typically higher in case of 
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products than it is in services, because of the 
difference in the size of the markets and in 
the intensity of competition.  Benzarti et al. 
(2017) analysed changes in Finland. in Fin-
land, the VAt rate on hairdressing services 
was decreased by 14 percentage points in 
2007, then it was restored to the original rate 
in 2012. Their results show that passthrough 
was immediate, and an asymmetric reaction 
to rate changes was still detectable after four 
years. Their analysis revealed a difference in 
the percentage of hairdressers adjusting their 
prices, depending on the direction of the rate 
change: following VAt rate decreases, 60% of 
the population of hairdressers kept their pric-
es unchanged, following VAt increases this 
proportion was 25%. Kosonen (2013) also 
analysed the Finnish case and found that fol-
lowing the reduction of the VAt rate on hair-
dressing, there was only a 50% passthrough. 
According to Carbonnier (2007), passthrough 
was far from full in the first 4 months in 
housing repair services and car sales after a 
VAt cut in France. Many studies have found 
partial or asymmetric passthrough in the res-
taurant sector (Benzarti and Carloni, 2017; 
Falkenhall et al., 2015; Harju and Kosonen, 
2014), while Gaarder (2016) analysed food 
items and found that when the VAt rate on 
food items was reduced from 24% to 12% in 
2001 in Norway, it was completely shifted to 
prices (see Table 3).
AnAlySiS mETHodology
Data
Our analysis relies on two data sources: 
the Harmonised index of Consumer Prices 
(HiCP) by eurostat, and data tables of con-
sumer price indices, weights, representative 
items and VAt rates, provided by the Hun-
garian Central Statistical Office (KSH). in 
Table 3
EMPIRICAL RESULTS ABOUT VAT PASSTHROUGH
Author Country Product 
scope
Period Results
Specific product categories
delipalla and 
o’donnell (2001)
Eu12 cigarettes 1982–97 no full passthrough.
Alm et. al (2009) uSA fuel 1984–1999 full passthrough in urban areas, partial 
passthrough in rural states.
poterba (1996) uSA clothing 1925–39 and 
1947–77
in the 1925–39 period retail prices rose by two-
thirds and in the 1947–77 period there was full 
passthrough.
Ally et al. (2014) great britain Alcohol 2008–2011 Retailers’ response to duty increases for alcohol 
show a certain asymmetry: passthrough of duty 
increases for the cheapest products is very low, 
while for expensive products, there is overshifting. 
This jeopardizes policy objectives.
berezvai (2018) Hungary fuel and 
alcohol
1998–2016 With beer, there is overshifting, while fuel price 
increase is proportionate to the increase in costs. 
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Author Country Product 
scope
Period Results
bergman and 
Hansen (2017)
denmark VAT changes 
of beer, soft 
drinks and 
liquors
1997–2005 Analysing three increases and three cuts regarding 
alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, they 
found overshifting. passthrough is higher if the 
VAT-change is lower. passthrough of increases 
is higher than that of cuts. getting further from 
the german border, passthrough for beer and soft 
drinks gets higher.
nerudová and 
dobranschi (2016)
czech Republic fuels 2009–2010 in case of fuels, there is overshifting. As a result, 
corrective environmental taxes have a significant 
distortive effect.
Services
carbonnier (2007) france car sales and 
housing repair 
services
1987–1999 findings regarding two VAT rate reductions in 
france: VAT rate shifting was 77% and 57% in 
the first four months for housing repair services 
and car sales. This is because the latter market is 
oligopolistic, while the former is closer to perfect 
(supply is less elastic).
barbone, 
Sobolewski and 
musters (2015)
European 
union
passenger 
transport
2001–2011 in more competitive markets (air transport and 
railway) there is almost full passthrough, while in 
road and waterborne transport it is not full, it depends 
on the competition.
Kosonen (2013) finland Hairdressing 2007–2011 passthrough of VAT-cuts is only about 50%. 
There is hardly any adjustment in the equilibrium 
quantity, profits increase. As a result, the 
effectiveness of VAT cuts in this service is called 
into question. There is heterogeneity in the results 
according to firm size.
benzarti et al. 
(2017)
finland, 
European 
union
Hairdress-
ing and more 
extended Eu 
data
1996–2015 Asymmetric passthrough: at the time of VAT rate 
reductions, 60% of the population of hairdressers 
kept their prices unchanged; following VAT 
increases this proportion was 25%. The usefulness 
of consumption tax cuts for economic stimulus 
purposes is doubtful. What is more, once 
temporary cuts expire, prices can even be higher 
than previously, due to the asymmetry.
benzarti and carloni 
(2017)
france Restaurant 
services
2004–2012 passthrough of VAT cuts is only partial. The effect 
on consumers was limited, and the VAT cuts 
mostly benefited owners: employees received 25% 
of the tax cuts while suppliers received 16% and 
owners received 41%.
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Author Country Product 
scope
Period Results
falkenhall et al. 
(2015)
Sweden Restaurant 
services
2003–2013 passthrough of the 2012 VAT rate cut is 50%. The 
industry is doing better, but this is less palpable 
for consumers. gradually increasing passthrough 
increases profitability, which attracts new operators 
to the market.
Harju and Kosonen 
(2014)
Sweden, 
finland
Restaurant 
services
2008–2013 The passthrough of VAT cuts is low, only 25%. 
The 2010 tax cut in finland and the 2012 tax cut 
in Sweden didn’t lead to an increase in either the 
amount of food sold or in wages. demand for 
restaurants is inelastic, employment in the sector 
did not increase.
Basket of products
Karádi (2016) Hungary processed food 2006 both VAT rate increases and decreases were fully 
shifted into prices: increases immediately, while 
decreases only gradually.
politi and mattos 
(2011)
brazil Ten food items 1994–2008 They reject the hypothesis of tax fullshifting in all 
cases, estimated values range from 55% for rice to 
26% for bread. passthrough is highly asymmetric. 
price adjustments take place within four months.
gaarder (2016) norway All food items 2001 When VAT on food items was reduced from 24% 
to 12% in 2001, it was completely shifted to 
prices.
benedek et al. 
(2015)
Eurozone 67 consump-
tion items 
and 1231 VAT 
changes
1999–2013 on average, one-third of VAT changes is passed 
forward to consumer prices. To assume full 
passthrough is a mistake, based on the extensive 
analysis it cannot be assumed.
jonker et al. (2004) the netherlands 80% of the 
cpi basket, 49 
products
1998–2003 VAT increase is almost fully passed through to 
consumer prices. Asymmetric reactions were 
identified. prices of energy and unprocessed food 
are the most flexible, whereas prices of services 
are the stickiest.
danninger and 
carare (2008)
germany 80% of the cpi 
basket
2006–2007 The estimated passthrough of the VAT increase in 
2007 is 73% over two years. one third took place 
in the year before the tax hike, and two-thirds took 
place at the time VAT hike was introduced. This 
explains why prices increased less than expected 
when the measure was implemented.
dijkstra et al. 
(2014)
the netherlands 93% of the 
Hicp basket
2001; 2012 The hypothesis of full passthrough of VAT 
increases could not be rejected for the 2001 and 
2012 VAT increases.
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our comparative analysis with other coun-
tries (synthetic control method), we use the 
HiCP database, and we mostly rely on KSH 
data to identify VAt rates. We use the COi-
COP (Classification of individual Consump-
tion According to Purpose) for breaking 
down price indices. Analyses of these data 
are fundamentally determined by the degree 
of detail of the data available for each year. 
data in the four-digit COiCOP structure 
have been available for Hungary since 2001, 
and for a longer period for several countries. 
Many countries have started publishing price 
indices in the five-digit COiCOP structure 
only recently.
Synthetic Control Method
The synthetic control method is a new meth-
odology developed in the 2000s, and it is the 
most suitable tool to answer the research ques-
tion of our study. its advantage is that it is 
a data-driven approach that only relies to a 
small extent on subjective choices (Falkenhall 
et al., 2015). together with harmonised indi-
ces of consumer prices, the synthetic control 
method provides a suitable tool for the analy-
sis of passthrough, especially for the study 
of country specific, individual and one-time 
price shocks. Thus the method analyses the 
behaviour of the price index in question, and 
Author Country Product 
scope
Period Results
carbonnier (2005) france 296 products 1995–2000 The analysis of three french tax reforms reveals 
an asymmetry: increases are fully shifted, while 
reductions are under-shifted.
chirakijja et al. 
(2009)
united 
Kingdom
55% of the 
consumer 
basket
2008 in response to the 2008 crisis, a temporary, one-
year reduction in the VAT rate was introduced in 
the country. passthrough of the VAT cut was quick 
and significant, approximately 75%.
pike (2009) united 
Kingdom
55% of the 
consumer 
basket
2008 The passthrough of the temporary VAT cut was 
less than 50%. later on, the price level gradually 
increased.
gábriel and Reiff 
(2006)
Hungary 76% of the cpi 
basket
2004; 2006 The VAT increase was quickly shifted to prices: 
70% passthrough over three months. Reaction to 
VAT cuts is slower and gradual, passthrough is 
lower than 25%, the effect is asymmetric.
benkovskis and 
fadejeva (2013)
latvia 42% of the cpi 
basket
2009; 2012 Approximately 84% of the 2009 VAT increase was 
passed on to consumers, whereas the passthrough 
of the VAT cut was only 45%. passthrough is 
asymmetric. The 2012 VAT cut was not passed on 
significantly to the prices of services, due to strong 
demand expectations.
Viren (2009) European 
union, finland
consumer 
prices
1970–2004 usually two thirds of tax increases are shifted to 
consumer prices.
Source: melioris and Sramkova (2015) and own compilation
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it doesn’t seek to explain VAt passthrough 
and its causal mechanisms (this is why funda-
mental determinants were presented in table 
1). This method is excellent for policy impact 
assessments. The application of the method is 
detailed in the following section.
We analyse the passthrough of VAt chang-
es in the past two years: VAt rates were re-
duced on pork in 2016, and on poultry, milk, 
egg, internet services, and catering supplied 
in restaurants in 2017 (Table 4).3 in 2014 and 
2015, VAt rates on live pig, half-carcasses of 
swine, other large animals and carcasses were 
decreased, but these products are not included 
in the consumer basket, so no data are avail-
able on their prices.4
The Hungarian price indices of the prod-
ucts concerned are compared to the price in-
dices of similar products in other european 
countries. For specific products, we use coun-
tries as a control group where the changes of 
the price index are the closest to the chang-
es in the Hungarian price index before the 
VAt cut. This weighted group of countries 
is selected with the synthetic control method 
(Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003, Abadie et 
al., 2011). 
Synthetic price index changes in Hungary 
without VAt changes are obtained from the 
weighted average of price index changes in 
countries in the synthetic control. explana-
tory variables used for selecting the synthetic 
control for the 2017 VAt changes were quar-
terly price index changes from Q1 2015 to 
Q3 2016, the annual change in 2015 and the 
annual change in 2016 without the last quar-
ter. We excluded the last quarter from the 
variables in order to see the effect of the VAt 
change in the run-up (we didn’t find such ef-
fect, eventually). For pork, we only have data 
for one year before the VAt change, so quar-
terly and annual data from 2015 are included 
in the explanatory variables. in addition, the 
control group of countries were narrowed 
down to countries in the region in case of 
pork, because in the second half of 2016 the 
opening towards the Chinese market caused a 
price shock in europe that increased the con-
sumer price of pork only in eastern europe. 
Table 5 shows, by product, which countries 
have a weight over 0.1 in the synthetic con-
trol.
to be able to compare the results with simi-
lar VAt trends in other countries, we calculat-
ed, using the same method, the passthrough 
of the decrease of the VAt rate on food items 
in Romania in 2015 and the VAt cut in cater-
ing in France, Sweden and Finland.
Table 4
VAT CHANGES IN 2016 AND 2017
Product group concerned VAT rate before  
%
VAT rate after  
%
Month of VAT change
pork 27 5 january 2016
poultry 27 5 january 2017
internet services 27 18 january 2017
milk 18 5 january 2017
egg 27 5 january 2017
restaurants 27 18 january 2017
Source: own compilation, based on KSH data
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pASSTHRougH of VAT cuTS
The results of calculations using the synthetic 
control method do not provide a coherent 
picture: in the case of certain products there 
is full passthrough, with others passthrough is 
only partial (Figure 1). it might be counterin-
tuitive, but it is a result that can be interpreted 
in light of economic theories and empirical 
findings: in some areas, prices increased after 
VAt cuts.
Figure 1 shows passthrough as a percent-
age of the VAt cut by product group, 3 
months after the change of the VAt rate. 
(For detailed data on price indices and syn-
thetic price index data, see Annex, Figure 1A.) 
in case of poultry and pork, there is almost 
full passthrough, which is similar to the ef-
fects of the 2015 reduction of the VAt rate on 
food items in Romania. As opposed to meat, 
passthrough to consumer prices was partial 
and slightly slower in case of fresh milk (see 
Annex, Figure 1A). Passthrough was partial in 
case of egg as well. in Romania, passthrough 
in the product group that contained milk, egg 
and other dairy products was also lower than 
in case of meat. 
The restaurant sector is special, because 
there the VAt cut did not shift to prices at all 
in Hungary, and in this product group there 
was a price increase in the first 1–9 months 
following the VAt cut. in the foreign exam-
ples of VAt rate cuts in the restaurant sec-
tor, passthrough was also low. Passthrough 
was almost full after the 2009 and 2012 VAt 
increases in Hungary, which points out the 
strong asymmetry in this sector, which is also 
substantiated by international literature (see 
Figure 2). 
Passthrough and economic consequences 
in Hungary, in light  
of  Hungarian and international results 
There are several similarities between Hun-
garian results and international, empirical re-
sults, which may help explain the great differ-
Table 5
COUNTRY WEIGHTS IN SYNTHETIC CONTROL PRICE INDICES
Pork Poultry Milk Egg Restaurant
Austria 0.30
belgium 0.16
bulgaria 0.16 0.36 0.31
czech Republic 0.11 0.53 0.20
greece 0.22 0.34
poland 0.29
germany 0.12 0.39
italy 0.34
Additional countries 0.62 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.32
Note: the market is not internationally competitive in the case of internet services, so we did not use the synthetic control method. As a result, 
no country weights for this are indicated in the table.
Source: own calculation
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ences in passthrough. different trends in the 
price of foodstuff, durable consumer goods 
and services are caused by the difference in 
the intensity of the competition and in mar-
ket structures (table 1). As these differences 
are primarily caused by the characteristics of 
products and services sold, these findings are 
internationally valid. 
According to Politi and Mattos (2011) VAt 
changes in Brazil also have an asymmetrical 
effect on basic foodstuff, so there are similari-
ties between our analysis and the Brazilian au-
thors’ research. At the 2006 VAt increase in 
Hungary (that applied to milk, egg, bread and 
cereals), there was overshifting, while at the 
2017 VAt cut, there was no full passthrough 
in case of milk. Yang and Ye (2008) provide 
an explanation, claiming that it is the theory 
of search costs that cause asymmetric effects. 
The authors believe that asymmetric effects 
are strong in case of products with a lower 
share of the consumption of households, as 
the cost of search for low prices outweigh the 
benefits. Passthrough was further decreased 
in case of fresh milk by the fact that not all 
consumers could clearly distinguish between 
fresh and non-fresh milk. These assumptions 
are substantiated by the fact that in Romania, 
passthrough was higher for dairy products 
and egg and there the VAt cut applied to all 
foodstuff.5
According to scientific literature, demand 
for basic food items is usually inelastic (as 
for their own-price elasticity, Cserháti and 
Keresztély, 2017). As a result, the amount 
consumed is less affected by the price change 
Figure 1
PASSTHROUGH AS A PERCENTAGE OF VAT REDUCTION PER PRODUCT GROUP,  
THREE MONTHS AFTER THE VAT CHANGE (%)
Note: VAT rates before and after the VAT rate change are indicated in square brackets. 
Source: own calculation
Pork  
(Hungary, 
2016)
Fresh milk 
(Hungary, 
2017)
Egg  
(Hungary, 
2017)
Poultry  
(Hungary, 
2017)
Internet services  
(Hungary,  
2017)
Meat  
(Romania, 
2015)
Dairy products 
(Romania, 
2015)
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than in case of products that are not “vital”. 
This means that VAt revenue losses appeared 
at the consumers, but they didn’t spend it to 
increase their consumption of products that 
had become cheaper. Cserháti and Keresztély 
(2017) calculated the effect of the 2016–2017 
VAt changes on demand from the own-price 
and cross-price elasticity estimated from 
2001–2015 consumption and price data: “the 
selective VAT rate cuts over 2 years increased 
the consumption of food purchased by an esti-
mated 0.9%. In particular, we estimate an in-
crease over 2% in the milk, dairy product and 
egg product group, and a 2–3% increase among 
vegetables and fruit, due to cross effects.” in the 
other product groups, their results show that 
consumption probably changed only insig-
nificantly after VAt changes, because of the 
low price-elasticity of products (e.g. meat) and 
the cross effects between product groups (e.g. 
bread).
Several studies analysed restaurant servic-
es. Benzarti and Carloni (2017), Falkenhall 
et al (2015), and Harju and Kosonen (2014) 
all found low or insignificant passthrough in 
the restaurant sector. They believe that VAt 
cuts in the restaurant sector have no effect 
on demand or employment, which didn’t 
increase after the VAt cuts in Finland in 
2010 and in Sweden in 2012. Falkenhall et 
al (2015) used the synthetic control method 
and found that instead of the above, VAt 
cuts increased profitability, and according to 
Benzarti and Carloni (2017), the VAt cut 
in France primarily resulted in an increase 
in profits for restaurants, and, to a smaller 
Figure 2
PASSTHROUGH AS A PERCENTAGE OF VAT CHANGE IN CATERING,  
3 MONTHS AFTER
Note: passthrough of VAT increases are indicated in black, passthrough of VAT reductions are indicated in grey. VAT rates before and after the 
VAT rate change are indicated in square brackets.
Source: own calculation
Catering 
(Hungary, 
2009)
Catering 
(Hungary, 
2012)
Catering 
(Hungary, 
2017)
Catering 
(France, 
2009)
Catering 
(Finland, 
2010)
Catering 
(Sweden, 
2012)
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extent, an increase in the wages in the sec-
tor. We can assume that the Hungarian 
VAt cut had similar effects and what was 
a revenue loss for the budget, increased the 
profits of restaurant owners and the wages 
of restaurant workers.6 The prices of restau-
rant services (and other products examined) 
may have been affected by the simultaneous 
increase of the minimum wage and general 
wage increases.
The passthrough of VAt changes described 
in the present study are necessary for the 
analysis of their economic and social effects, 
i.e. how economic and social policy objec-
tives are fulfilled. it is an open research ques-
tion whether in cases where there was no full 
passthrough (restaurants, fresh milk, egg), in 
which part of the production and marketing 
chain VAt cuts appeared and whether they 
had economic effects beyond an increase in 
profits and wages. 
concluSionS
in our study, we aimed to introduce and de-
scribe the passthrough of the 2016–2017 VAt 
changes in Hungary. Our empirical analy-
sis relied on the synthetic control method, a 
method only rarely used in literature. With 
this method, we established that the larger 
part of VAt cuts were shifted to the consumer 
prices of pork and poultry, and that there were 
similarities in this regard with the 2015 VAt 
cuts in Romania. Within 6 months of the 
implementation of the VAt cut, the price of 
pork significantly increased as a result of inter-
national price increases. Prices were partially 
affected by the decrease in the VAt rate on 
fresh milk and egg, but were not affected by 
the VAt cut in the restaurant sector at all: in 
this product group, there were price increases 
in the months following the VAt cut.
The passthrough of the VAt cut was al-
most full for several basic food items, even 
though there was no passthrough whatsoever 
in the restaurant sector. This draws attention 
to other economic mechanisms that work 
through the mechanism of passthrough. We 
find it plausible that in the restaurant sector, 
the VAt cut was used to increase wages and 
profits instead of decreasing consumer prices: 
this conclusion is substantiated by our study 
and extensive foreign literature. 
Our analysis refutes the hypothesis of sym-
metric passthrough, popular among econo-
mists for a long time, especially in the restau-
rant sector. in addition, the present analysis 
will hopefully provide useful empirical facts 
for future research to rely on.
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Appendix
Figure 1A
PASSTHROUGH OF VAT CUTS IN HUNGARY IN 2016 AND 2017 AND IN ROMANIA IN 2015
Note: VAT rates before and after the VAT rate change are indicated in square brackets.
Source: own calculation
Pork [27–5]
Egg [27–5]
Poultry [27–5]
Fresh milk [18–5]
Meat (Romania, 2015)  [24–9]Dairy products (Romania, 2015)  [24–9]
Real                              Synthetic                              Synthetic with full passthrough
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Appendix
Figure 1B
ASYMMETRIC PASSTHROUGH OF VAT CHANGES IN THE CATERING SECTOR
Note: VAT rates before and after the VAT rate change are indicated in square brackets.
Source: own calculation
Catering (Hungary, 2009) [20–25]
Catering (Hungary, 2017) [27-18]
Catering (Finland, 2010) [22-13]
Catering (Hungary, 2012) [25-27]
Catering (Sweden, 2012) [25-12]
Catering (France, 2009) [19.6-5.5]
Real                              Synthetic                              Synthetic with full passthrough
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